Nathan Ballantyne
University of
Toronto
Jones stares at the wall and it appears to him that it is red. In a recent series of papers, James Pryor has argued that Jones’ perceptual experience of a red wall is a source of justification for him to believe the wall is red, on the condition that evidence for the unreliability of the perceptual faculty in question is absent, even if evidence to believe that the faculty is reliable is also absent. I dub this view absentism. In this paper, I take a critical look at absentism. I outline the main features of absentism, evaluate a problem for absentism recently proposed by Matthias Steup, and finally, consider an evidential problem that besets absentism. I argue that, surprisingly, absentism fails because of a particular absence of evidence.
Andy Cullison
University of
Rochester
Basic moral beliefs are moral beliefs that are justified moral beliefs that are not justified in virtue of any inferential relations to other beliefs. I try to explain how basic moral beliefs can be justified without appealing to self-evidence. I do so by defending an epistemic principle called phenomenal conservatism. Phenomenal Conservatism is as follows: If it seems to S that P, then S has prima facie justification for believing that P. There have been several recent attempts both to defend and reject this principle. I consider those attempts. I argue that the reasons in favor of phenomenal conservatism outweigh the reasons against it. Since phenomenal conservatism is a fully general principle, it can be used to explain how basic moral beliefs are justified.
Emily Esch
Cornell University
Alex Byrne (2002) offers an argument, inspired by Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, which he thinks poses a puzzle about the nature of perceptual experience. In response to this puzzle, Byrne argues that the content of our perceptual experiences is partially ineffable; that is, the content of perceptual experience cannot be entirely expressed in words. I argue that an appropriate understanding of the notion of ineffability is incompatible with representationalism, the claim that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, which Byrne accepts. Furthermore, I offer some arguments in favor of ineffable content, which, if good, would give us a reason to reject representationalism.
Elizabeth Palmer
Indiana University,
Bloomington
One cannot believe that p if one does not hold that p is true. If one holds that p is true, one believes that p. While widely accepted, we should go further and say that forming a belief is an active, not a passive, process. Agents do something when they form beliefs. Moreover, since an agent cannot believe a proposition that she holds is false, when forming beliefs, an agent intends only to believe a proposition if it is likely to be true. Further, the formation of each deliberative belief, a belief formed as a result of deliberation, is caused by the specific intention only to hold a particular proposition if it is likely to be true.
Largely restricting myself to deliberative beliefs, I propose that forming a deliberative belief that p corresponds to the general account of action because forming a deliberative belief that p involves both an agent bringing it about that she believes that p and an agents possessing a causally efficacious intention, namely to believe that p only if p is likely to be true. Consequently, forming a deliberative belief that p is an action.
Evan Riley
University of Pittsburgh
I argue that there is a conceptual tension in the substantive view of deontological libertarianism, not previously recognized. I view such libertarianism, non-eccentrically, as a variant of deontological liberalism, one that centrally includes a characteristic commitment to the sanctity of private property in worldly goods. The tension comes directly out of that characteristic commitment on my account.
Specifically, I first show that the deontological libertarian is committed to an inconsistent triad of claims. I begin by noting that the libertarian holds that the strict duty to respect legitimately originated claim-rights to property is universal. I start my argument by advancing the claim that people are, in general, under such duties only where we also see them as bearers of moral vision. I go on to argue that given the nature of moral vision, in particular given its being in part produced by a decent upbringing, the libertarian ends in contradiction, for she must recognize the possibility that some people lack moral vision and so are under no strict moral duties at all. I go on to argue that the libertarian, in the face of the tension I diagnose, must qualify a central tenet of her doctrine. I go on to argue that the doctrinal modification so forced on the libertarian leaves her facing two options, either of which she will find unpalatable. Either she must admit that libertarianism is fundamentally incomplete as an account of justice, or she must shift the doctrine such that it becomes a version of redistributivist liberalism. If I can make good on this it will be a reasonably exciting result, for the libertarian is left unable to simply affirm her favored conception of the basic liberties in reply.
Megan Wallace
University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill
Suppose you are somewhat persuaded by the arguments for Eliminative Materialism, but are put-off by the view itself. For instance, you might be sympathetic to one or more of the following considerations: (1) that folk psychology is a bad theory and will be soon replaced by cognitive science or neuroscience, (2) that folk psychology will never be vindicated by cognitive science, (3) that folk psychology makes ontological commitments to weird or spooky things that no proper science will admit the existence of, (4) that folk psychology seems to lead to a sort of epiphenomenalism (which is yet another thing thats weird and spooky), and (5) that folk psychology seems to lead to the conclusion that mental content is either determined by things outside the head or is completely indeterminate, neither of which is appealing. Yet in spite of your sympathy for any one of (1)-(5), you may nonetheless cringe at the consequence of them—that is, you may be unwilling to accept the Eliminative Materialists radical claim that there are no beliefs, desires, etc.
So just what are you to do to accommodate your seemingly conflicting intuitions?
To relieve the conflict, I propose Mental Fictionalism.
Mental Fictionalism is the view that we are (or should be) fictionalists about mental states. More specifically, this includes the semantic claim that all of our mental talk includes a hidden fictional operator. So, for example, statements such as “Granny believes there’s a beer in the fridge” or “Granny wants a beer” will get recast as “In the folk psychological fiction, Granny believes there’s a beer in the fridge” and “In the folk psychological fiction, Granny wants a beer,” respectively.
There are many advantages to being a fictionalist about mental states. First, one gets all of the advantages of being an Eliminative Materialist, without the counterintuitive consequences. Second, one avoids some of the more persuasive arguments against Eliminative Materialism. Third, one avoids many of the problems that typically follow fictionalist accounts in general (e.g., modal fictionalism, moral fictionalism, abstract fictionalism, etc). My paper, then, aims to discuss these advantages—and possible disadvantages!—of Mental Fictionalism.
Nathan Ballantyne is interested in contemporary epistemology and medieval philosophy. He's presently completing his first year of graduate work. In his spare time, he enjoys viewing a film, going for a walk, and listening to the music of Glenn Gould, though never simultaneously.
Andrew Cullison is a fourth year graduate student at the University of Rochester. His dissertation is on moral knowledge, and he hopes to defend it this summer. His other philosophical interests include philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion.
Emily Esch is primarily interested in philosophy of mind. She is currently writing a dissertation on phenomenal concepts, the concepts we use when thinking about what our experiences are like. When not busy introspecting, she enjoys cooking and hanging out with her dog, cat, and husband.
Elizabeth Palmer's primary area of interest is contemporary epistemology: in particular, she is concerned with conditions for justification, the internalism/externalism debate, and, to a lesser extent, skepticism. Her current project is the investigation of the tenability of the suspension of beliefs and how this relates to epistemic responsibility.
Evan Riley is at work on a dissertation that defends a Left Lockean approach to the traditional questions of political philosophy. His general intellectual interests are primarily in the history of moral and political philosophy.
Meg Wallace works mostly in metaphysics and philosophy of language, with a bit of recent dabbling in philsophy of mind. She will be finishing her thesis on Sligshot arguments entitled "Rearming the Slingshot" by May 2005.