

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND  
BRENDAN MURDAY

Text: *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*  
David Chalmers  
Oxford, 2002.

- Week 1: Dualism and Behaviorism  
Descartes, 'Meditations on First Philosophy'; 'Passions of the Soul'.  
Ryle, 'Descartes' Myth'.  
Putnam, 'Brains and Behavior'.
- Week 2: Identity, Functionalism  
Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes'.  
Feigl, 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"'.  
Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States'.  
Armstrong, 'The Causal Theory of the Mind'.
- Week 3: Functionalism and Monism  
Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism'.  
Davidson, 'Mental Events'.
- Weeks 4-5: Eliminativism and Supervenience  
Fodor, 'Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)'.  
Kim, 'Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction'.  
Horgan, 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World'.
- Weeks 5-6: Mental Causation  
Kim, 'The Many Problems of Mental Causation'.  
Yablo, 'Mental Causation'.
- Weeks 6-7: Qualia  
Block, 'Concepts of Consciousness'.  
Nagel, 'What is it Like to Be a Bat?'.  
Dennett, 'Quining Qualia'.
- Weeks 7-8: The Knowledge Argument  
Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia'.  
Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches'.  
Loar, 'Phenomenal States'.

- Weeks 8-9: The Explanatory Gap  
Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity'.  
Hill, 'Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem'.  
Block and Stalnaker, 'Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap'.
- Week 10: Consciousness  
Rosenthal, 'Explaining Consciousness'.  
Dretske, 'Conscious Experience'.  
Peacocke, 'Sensation and the Content of Experience: A Distinction'.
- Week 11: Intentionality  
Brentano, 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena'.  
Chisholm, "'Intentional Inexistence'".  
Millikan, 'Biosemantics'.
- Week 12: Propositional Attitudes  
Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'.  
Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes'.
- Weeks 13-14: Internalism and Externalism  
Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental'.  
Chalmers, 'The Components of Content'.  
McKinsey, 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access'.  
Brueckner, 'What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori'.